February 11th, 2024 - 14th Report: Political Camps

 

February 11^th, 2024

Dear family and friends,

Report number 14: political camps

For the first time since October 7^th, all three of my mobilized nephews are de-mobilized. It’s only temporary, because soon they’ll start second rounds. This is an emerging serious issue, and maybe I’ll write about it someday.

Part of our gradual return to a semblance of (very strange) normalcy is that I’ve gone back to writing. At the moment I’ve got four active projects. In addition, I just spent a chunk of time at Yad Vashem, which I left in 2007. I’ve been trying to help the new bosses figure out what they have an archive for, and what they should be doing with it. The slowing pace of these reports is because of all this, not because they’re nothing left to tell.

Today I’m taking a shortcut. The other day I wrote a Hebrew-language column about our political camps, and it occurs to me it could fit in here. Here’s an English version.

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Ultimately the question is if Israel will determine its future based on fear or hope, and if hope, messianic or secular.

In their relation to the Palestinians, the continuum from extreme right to radical left can be broadly divided into three over-arching camps. Each camp is distinguished by its own set of basic assumptions about human nature, and about Israel’s purpose.

The messianic settlers:

They object to dividing the Land of Israel in any scenario, even if this prevents peace. In their belief, the Zionist project is to bring Redemption. In the 20^th century God launched a process of Redemption which involves the interaction of His Will and the actions of the Jews. Redeeming the Land of Israel is the central plank of this project, though later on it will include the return of the Jews to their God. This set of beliefs is new, invented over the past century.

The holy texts, from the Bible on, are their source of authority for morality, warfare, diplomacy and personal behavior. They have no objection to universal morals or international law, unless they see contradictions, in which case the religious texts take precedence.

The settlers have objected every time Israel relinquished territory since 1974 (Egypt, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, the Oslo Process, Gaza in 2005), but they generally frame their objections in secular terms, so as to convince the security-minded majority. Yet this is a smokescreen. Their objection is religious. As they see it, relinquishing territory foils God’s plan, and God’s plan is Israel’s reason to exist.

It’s worth noting that this is an optimistic world-view, as it strives for, and expects, a near messianic future. Unlike the next camp, which is motivated by fear, not hope.

The security-seekers:

This is by far the largest group. It covers most Israelis, from the traditional right to the edges of the left. Hypothetically they have no objection to peacefully partitioning the land with the Palestinians, if only the Palestinians were willing to reciprocate. In reality, their position is that Israel needs to control the land and be militarily strong. Each time Israel relinquished territory, from 1974 till 2005, it was because this camp supported the move. These days they agree that trading land for peace with Arab States was successful, but not with the Palestinians, because the Palestinians demand the whole country. (Just as the settlers do). The 2^nd intifada (2000-2004) convinced them the Palestinians of our generation are not ready for peace alongside Israel. The current war has convinced them foreseeable generations of Palestinians won’t be, either. Indeed, the bloody Hamas attack has retroactively convinced them, if the 2^nd Intifada hadn’t already, that the entire Oslo Process was a horrible mistake, and dismantling Israeli settlements in Gaza, in 2005, led directly to October 7^th.

They have no objections to universal morality, and see themselves as bound by it. Nor do they have any principled argument with international law. They often differ, however, from foreign application of universal morality, and are deeply skeptical of foreign interpretations of international law. Especially when these threaten Israel’s security or determination to defend itself.

It's a bleak and pessimistic world-view, motivated by fear.

The peace camp:

The members of this (tiny) camp object to Israel’s occupation of land beyond the Green Line of June 5^th, 1967. Their world-view starts from universal principles. They regard the principles of the Enlightenment as binding, and have respect for international laws and institutions. They understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as yet another, admittedly intractable, conflict, which will be positively or negatively influenced by the same types of universal considerations that motivate any other conflict.

Their support for Israeli evacuations of territory begins even before their pragmatic analysis of the details. This is partly because of a crucial distinction between them and everyone else: they are acutely aware of the extent of harm Israel’s actions inflict on the Palestinians. In their understanding, the failure of the Oslo Process was a joint project of insincerity and violations by both sides (and ineptness by the Americans). They wish to leave territories beyond the Green Line because they believe Israel within that line is enough. The purpose of Israel is to defend the Jews from persecution and to create a modern version of Judaism as part of the enlightened world.

It’s an optimistic world-view.

The Ultra-orthodox (Haredi):

They are convinced non-Jews mostly hate Jews, always have and always will. They don’t believe in the new-fangled messianism of the settlers. This puts them at the right end of the security-seeker’s camp.

Today I’m not discussing the roughly 20% of Israelis who are Arabs, not because they’re not important, but because their dynamic is different.

Relations with the Palestinians:

In the opinion of the settlers, the Palestinians have no national rights, and thus also no claim on citizenship or national voting rights. When in the future the Palestinians accept this, Israel will owe them the conditions for personal freedom and economic well-being. Some settlers look forward to a mass migration of Palestinians.

The security-seekers have no objection to Palestinian sovereignty, freedom, and rights, but only when the time comes. It’s not near. Until then the conflict needs to be managed. Israel should refrain from provocations, but will use force when necessary.

The peace camp regrets that both sides prevent peace by their actions, but since Israel is the powerful side, its responsibility is greater. Their fundamental position is that Palestinians are exactly as human as the Israelis, with the full gamut of generosity, foibles, weaknesses and cruelty – though even hardened peace-mongers don’t attribute to the Israelis intentions of mass murder or systematic rape.

The current war:

From the settler’s perspective, Hamas reminded us how fundamental its genocidal intentions are, and in response Israel must destroy it. Completely, as God once commanded the destruction of Amalek. The military victory must be complete, and final. This will remind the Jews of their pact with God, and they will embrace the messianic path. Jews will of course settle in Gaza, and hopefully many Gazans will decide to move elsewhere – but in any case, they’ll be cowed.

Anything less than total victory will endanger the entire enterprise, and must be prevented. Even a deal to free the hostages must be blocked, because it would result in less than total victory.

The security-seekers agree about the depravity that Hamas presented. Its ability to rule must be destroyed; thereafter, Israel will need to apply some force for many years to prevent its reappearance. The large-scale collateral damage in Gaza is because of Hamas, and since Israel doesn’t actively intend it, it’s justified. No Jews should settle in Gaza, and there needs to be a mechanism for someone who’s not Israel to run the civilian aspects of Gazan life. This large camp doesn’t have a consensus on the price Israel should pay to free the hostages – one reason they’re not being freed.

The peace camp also agrees about the horrific brutality of Hamas. (It’s hard not to). Holding the hostages is also horrific. Their lesson from the attack, however, contradicts everyone else. The conflict cannot be managed, because it will explode again and again. The only resolution is to have two sovereign states, hopefully both democratic and peace-seeking. It should be added that the Israeli peace camp is far too small and weak to bring this about, nor is it clear how many Palestinians seek the same goal. Their significance is in reminding the rest of the Israelis of the potential, and perhaps convincing more of them should the situation improve. (Right now it’s dire).

The peace camp seeks an agreement to free the hostages immediately, and is mostly unfazed by the price.

The messianic settlers and the peace camp are diametrically opposed, and will never agree. The security-seekers are structurally closer to the peaceniks, with whom they have no philosophical argument, but practically they’re closer to the settlers. Since October 7^th their practical agreement with the settlers is great, and their practical disagreement with the peaceniks is deep. The chance for future peace hangs on the possibility of creating Israeli patience with Palestinian needs, simultaneously with Palestinian willingness and ability to allay Israeli fears. This doesn’t seem likely at the moment, but it could happen someday. When it does, a very large camp of Israelis could support peace.

 

Yaacov